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Although robots are becoming an ever-growing presence in society, we do
not hold the same expectations for robots as we do for humans, nor do we
treat them the same. As such, the ability to recognize cues to human animacy
is fundamental for guiding social interactions. We review literature that demon-
strates cortical networks associated with person perception, action observation
and mentalizing are sensitive to human animacy information. In addition, we
show that most prior research has explored stimulus properties of artificial
agents (humanness of appearance ormotion), with less investigation into knowl-
edge cues (whether an agent is believed to have human or artificial origins).
Therefore, currently little is known about the relationship between stimulus
and knowledge cues to human animacy in terms of cognitive and brainmechan-
isms. Using fMRI, an elaborate belief manipulation, and human and robot
avatars, we found that knowledge cues to human animacy modulate engage-
ment of person perception and mentalizing networks, while stimulus cues to
human animacy had less impact on social brain networks. These findings
demonstrate that self–other similarities are not only grounded in physical fea-
tures but are also shaped by prior knowledge. More broadly, as artificial
agents fulfil increasingly social roles, a challenge for roboticists will be to
manage the impact of pre-conceived beliefswhile optimizing human-like design.1. Introduction
Detection and recognitionof otheragents is a necessaryability across species. It is an
integral pre-requisite for social interaction: one must accurately identify others in
order to appropriately interact with them. For instance, one would not expect a
robot to offer the same opportunities for social interaction as a human. Considering
the predicted rise of artificial agents in society performing tasks alongside humans
in hospitals, care homes and schools [1], it will become increasingly important
to distinguish between animate agents (e.g. humans) and inanimate agents
(e.g. robots). Robots can act in the world by moving and achieving goals, but they
are not sentient or intentional. Indeed, a key factor for classifying other agents is
the perception of animacy—the presence of life in others. The distinct way that
robots and humans look and move as well as what we know about their origins
offer important cues to animacy [2]. As such, a key question for social cognition
and social neuroscience research pertains to understanding the cognitive and
neurobiologicalmechanismsthat enable us to recognize animacy in otheragents [3].
(a) The neuroscience of social perception and cognition
The neuroscience of social cognition is concerned with how the brain manages
social interactions with others [4]. Several distinct brain circuits have been
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Figure 1. Social brain circuits. mPFC, medial prefrontal cortex; TP, temporal poles; Prec., precuneus; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; IPL, inferior parietal lobule; TPJ,
temporoparietal junction; pSTS, posterior superior temporal sulcus; FG, fusiform gyrus; OT, occipitotemporal cortex. The mirror neuron system and pSTS form the key
nodes of the action observation network.
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which are of particular relevance to the current study
(figure 1). Person perception research has shown how sen-
sory systems are sensitive to the presence of conspecifics in
the environment [5]. For instance, patches of cortex in the
ventral visual stream including fusiform and occipitotem-
poral gyri respond preferentially to images of social stimuli
(faces and bodies) compared to non-social stimuli (houses
and cars) [6,7]. Accumulating evidence suggests the ventral
visual stream contributes to understanding identity through
processing physical appearance, such as facial features,
body shape and posture [5,8].
Another form of social perception involves observing
others moving through the environment and interacting
with objects. Brain regions responding to the observation of
others in action include posterior temporal gyri, inferior par-
ietal lobule and inferior frontal gyrus [9–11]. The frontal and
parietal responses are consistent with research into the mirror
neuron system discovered in monkeys, which shows similar
responses to performed and observed actions [12]. One domi-
nant theory argues that this frontoparietal network enables
action understanding through simulation by mapping
observed actions onto the observer’s own motor system [13].
Simply coding the physical characteristics of other agents
and their movements would not, however, be sufficient to
understand the meaning of their actions. It is also necessary
to make inferences about information one cannot see, such as
others’ beliefs, desires, attitudes and traits [14]. A third strand
of social cognition research—mentalizing—aims to delineate
the cognitive and brain systems integral to representing such
mental states of others [15]. Brain circuits spanning the medial
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ), tem-
poral poles and precuneus are consistently engaged when
inferring and evaluating mental states and are collectively
known as the theory of mind network [4,15]. The ability to
draw inferences about underlying intentions helps us to predict
what another individual may do next and helps to regulate
social interactions [3,16]. Together, the studies highlighted
in this section have identified discrete brain circuits that sub-
serve aspects of social perception and interaction. It is less
clear, however, how social information is organized beyond a
social–non-social distinction.
(b) The ‘like-me’ hypothesis
One dominant model in social cognition states that under-
standing the similarity between self and other is a basic
principle of social cognition and that humans have developed
to seekout self–other equivalence [17,18]. This account, known
as the ‘like-me’ hypothesis, further proposes that actionsperformed by oneself and another are represented in
common cognitive codes [17]. At the core of the ‘like-me’
hypothesis is the proposal that cognitive and brain mechan-
isms have been shaped to show sensitivity to information
that is physically or cognitively similar to one’s own makeup.
This view is consistent with the biological imperative to
detect similar others as a foundation for successful navigation
of the world [3].
One approach to test predictions that follow from the
‘like-me’ hypothesis has been to vary cues to human ani-
macy. In such studies, the idea is that the more human-like
an agent is perceived, in terms of physical appearance and
intentionality, the more it is considered to be ‘like me’.
These studies have fallen into two main camps based on
the type of cues to human animacy under investigation.
One camp has manipulated stimulus features, such as what
an agent looks like or how it moves. The second camp has
manipulated knowledge cues to animacy, such as whether
an observer believes an agent to be human or not. Both cue
types are of clear relevance to the study of social perception.
Humans move in a particular way, for instance using a mini-
mum jerk trajectory, and have a particular form (i.e. head
above a torso with limbs). Such distinctive physical features
can be diagnostic of a human presence. Likewise, knowledge
cues also matter for interpreting human animacy. If you
know the gorilla across the street is actually a man in a cos-
tume, your perception of the social environment would be
markedly different from if you were not aware of this fact.
In the following, we review behavioural and brain-imaging
studies that have manipulated stimulus cues and knowledge
cues to human animacy. Instead of an exhaustive review of all
studies exploring animacy detection, our focus is on brain
systems that index the distinction between human and
non-human agents.
(c) Stimulus cues to human animacy
The majority of research into cues influencing animacy per-
ception has focused on stimulus cues to human animacy,
such as what an agent looks like and how it moves. These
can be considered ‘bottom-up’ cues that are determined by
the visual appearance of the form and motion of an agent.
Many studies have investigated responses along the ventral
visual stream to depictions of human compared to non-
human stimuli, such as other animals or inanimate objects
[19,20]. Less research in the domain of person perception
has varied cues to human animacy by comparing human to
less human or robotic agents [21,22]. Gobbini et al. [21]
showed similar engagement of core face perception areas—
fusiform face area (FFA), occipital face area (OFA) and
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
371:20150075
3
 on January 7, 2016http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from posterior superior temporal sulcus—when observing human
and artificial, robotic faces. In addition, core face and body
processing regions also respond to cartoon and schematic
depictions of faces and bodies [6,22]. Thus, the ventral
visual stream appears to be indifferent to animacy cues that
are based on physical form and responds to real faces and
bodies as well as face- and body-like forms.
In the domain of action perception, where agents aremoving
in the world and sometimes interacting with objects, results are
mixed. The superior temporal sulcus has been shown to respond
to biological motion, even in the absence of a clear human form
[23,24]. Many studies have also compared the observation of
actions performed by humans and robots. A common result is
more engagement of sensorimotor brain regions collectively
termed the action observation network (AON) and facilitated be-
havioural responses when the agent is more human than not
[25,26]. For example, observing human form and motion
increasedmotor priming in an imitation task [27,28]. In addition,
right premotor cortex is engagedmore during the observation of
reaching actions performed by a human hand compared to a
robotic claw [29]. These results are consistent with a self-
similarity bias and more AON engagement when an observed
agent is more human.
Onfurther inspectionof theactionperceptionliterature,how-
ever, several studies show indifference in the AON to degrees of
stimulus-driven humanness or even a preference for non-human
stimuli. For instance, Gazzola et al. [30] failed to find any differ-
ence in brain responses when participants viewed actions
performed by a human or robotic hand. Likewise, Ramsey &
Hamilton [31] found that the left anterior intraparietal sulcus, a
core AON node, responded in a similar manner when partici-
pants observed a geometric shape or a human hand perform
goal-directed actions. Moreover, some studies show an even
greater response in the AONwhen perceiving non-human com-
pared to human visual cues [32,33]. In two experiments, Cross
and co-workers show greater engagement when watching rigid
robotic movement compared to natural free-flowing dance
moves that are more consistent with a human’s motor repertoire
[32]. This robust AON engagement was seen when participants
observed a human actor dancing and when observing a robot
toy animated to move in a similar manner. Therefore, the AON
was shown to be more sensitive to rigid, non-human-like move-
ment irrespective of animacy cues based on physical form.
Finally, Saygin & Stadler [33] found that middle temporal
gyrus and intraparietal sulcus are more sensitive to an android
(a robot dressed as a human) than a clearly presented human
or robot actor. Thus, the role of the AON in response to varying
stimulus cues to human animacy remains somewhat unclear.
Stimulus cues can also drive mental state reasoning and
engagement of the person knowledge or theory of mind net-
work. Heider & Simmel [34] showed that when people
observe simple shapesmoving around as if they are interacting,
they ascribe human-likemental states to these shapes. Using the
same stimuli, Castelli et al. [35] demonstrated that these stimuli
also engage brain regions associated with mental state reason-
ing and social cognition (see also [36]). Social context can also
lead to mental state reasoning if stimuli are arranged in a
manner that makes a moving object look like a social agent
(such as an ice skater) rather than an inanimate object (like a
spinning top [37]). Finally, the same movie footage of social
interactions engages person knowledge networks more if real
video footage is viewed rather than modified versions that
have been made to appear ‘cartoonish’ [38]. Together, thiswork suggests that stimulus cues alone can provide an input
to human-like mental state and animacy judgements.
(d) Knowledge cues to human animacy
Knowledge cues to animacy are based on beliefs about
an agent’s animate origins and can be task instructed or task
independent [39]. These can be considered ‘top-down’ cues
that are driven by prior information about the stimulus,
rather than by the visible form and motion cues. The impact
of knowledge cues can be seen most clearly when visually
identical stimuli are encountered across different conditions,
which vary knowledge about the agent’s humanness. Thus,
any differences in cognitive or brain function are cued by
information that is independent to the stimulus.
A growing body of behavioural evidence supports
the notion that beliefs about humanness influence social percep-
tion and interaction [39–44]. For example, Liepelt & Brass [45]
used an automatic imitation task and found that participants
showed stronger evidence of motor priming when movements
were thought to be made by a human rather than a wooden
hand. Using simplified moving dot stimuli, Stanley et al.
[41,42] showed increased behavioural interference together
with reports of stimuli appearing more human-like when
participants believed the stimuli originated from real human
movement compared to computer-generated movement.
Finally, using a manipulation where participants were required
to coordinate their actions with a physically present humanoid
robot, Stenzel et al. [43] found that participants weremore likely
to represent the robot’s action if they believed that the robot’s
behaviour was based on a biologically inspired neural network
than when it was based on a computer program.
Neuroimaging research has also varied knowledge cues to
human animacy. Seminal fMRI studies of theory of mind used
the same stimuli for both ‘human’ and ‘computer’ conditions,
and varied participant instructions. The instruction ‘you are
playing with a human’ gave rise to robust activation in the
personknowledgenetwork [46,47]. That is, the identical stimulus
increasingly activated social brain regions when participants
believed it originated in another person, not a computer.
(e) Combined stimulus and knowledge cues
to human animacy
Few studies have directly compared stimulus and knowledge
cues to human animacy. Press et al. [28] showed that stimulus
cues to animacy override knowledge cues when imitating
hand actions. By contrast, Stanley et al. [41] showed that
knowledge of howamoving dotwasmade (human versus com-
puter-generated) dominated perception of animacy compared to
its motion properties. Klapper et al. [40] showed that both types
of cue influence imitation of hand actions. Moreover, fMRI
results from the study by Klapper and co-workers showed that
right TPJ was engaged more during an automatic imitation
taskwhen both stimulus andknowledge cues to human animacy
were present than when only one or neither cue to human ani-
macy was present [40]. This result supports the view that right
TPJ may be particularly sensitive to controlling interactions
with human agents [48,49].
A neuroimaging study by Stanley et al. [42] manipulated
both types of cue by investigating passive observation of
point-light animations. Point-light stimuli typically consist
of a sequence of moving dots, representing several joints on
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cal motion [50]. This study found that knowledge of human
animacy engagedmPFCmore than knowledge that the stimuli
were computer-generated. By contrast, human-like movement
did not engage social brain circuits more than less-human
movement. While emerging evidence suggests instances
when both stimulus and knowledge cues influence social per-
ception and cognition, the conditions and parameters that lead
to these biases remain largely unknown.
( f ) Summary and the current study
Evidence suggests widespread cortical engagement of distinct
social brain circuits for detecting and recognizing aspects of
human animacy during social interactions. Stimulus and knowl-
edge cues to human animacy engage person perception, action
observation and mental state reasoning networks. The picture
to date remains far from clear, but there appears to be some
kernel of truth to the suggestion that a mechanism of self-
similarity or ‘like me’ may operate across these studies. Many
questions remain unanswered, however. A growing number
of studies show indifferent or opposite brain or behavioural
responses to those consistent with a theory based on self-bias.
Moreover, few neuroimaging studies have directly compared
stimulus and knowledge cues to human animacy in the same
experiment to tease apart their relative contributions to detection
and recognition of other humans. Indeed, only one other study
to date has investigated action perception in this manner and
this study did not present visible human features, such as
faces or body parts, but instead used point-light displays of
simple actions [42]. Hence, it remains unclear how perception
of action is influenced by cues to human animacy, particularly
when physical form cues are visible.
The current study, therefore, directly compares stimulus
and knowledge cues to human animacy during the observation
of agents interacting with objects. Face and body cues are
manipulated aswell as beliefs about the origins of such actions.
By doing so, we are able to investigate which cues to animacy
dominate perception of action aswell as how these cues engage
social brain circuits. To support the ‘like-me’ hypothesis, we
would expect greater engagement of brain regions implicated
in action observation [25,29], mentalizing [42,46,47] and
person perception [25,26] when stimulus or knowledge cues
to human animacy (or both) are present. However, as a
number of recent studies suggest [21,30–33], we might also
find that parts of the social brain are not solely tuned to prefer-
entially respond to cues that are ‘like me’. Thus, the current
study will provide novel insights into aspects of the social
brain that are more or less responsive to features of an agent
that are ‘like me’ through careful manipulation of stimulus
and knowledge cues to human animacy.2. Material and methods
(a) Participants
Twenty-nine physically and neurologically healthy young adults
were recruited from the fMRI Database of theMax Planck Institute
for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences (Leipzig, Germany). All
were monetarily compensated for their involvement and provided
written informed consent in line with procedures set forth by the
local ethics board. Six participants were excluded from the final
analyses due to not believing the cover story (see Behavioural
Procedure and Task). The final sample included 23 participants (14women, nine men; Mage ¼ 26.41 years, s.d. ¼ 3.02 years) who
believed the cover story. All participants were native German
speakers and right handed as measured by the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory [51].
(b) Stimuli
Stimuli were created using POSER 7 three-dimensional animation
software (SmithMicro Software Inc, Santa Cruz, CA, USA) and
featured 10 object-directed actions (figure 2). Each video lasted
5 s. To create the stimuli, a human actor was first filmed perform-
ing each action, and these videos served as a model for creating
the Poser videos. Each action was mapped onto two different
avatars: a human male and a custom-designed robot (figure 2).
Each action was ‘filmed’ from the waist upwards and from
three different angles: centre, off centre and from the side (see
right panel of figure 2a). These procedures yielded 60 videos
in total (10 different actions  2 different agents  3 different
viewing angles).
(c) Belief manipulation
In order tomanipulate knowledge cues to human animacy, partici-
pants were told the current study was commissioned by a major
German film studio for the purpose of examining how the
human brain processes two cutting-edge animation techniques:
human motion capture and computer-generated keyframe anima-
tion. Before taking part in the experiment, participants watched a
10-min custom-made and professionally produced ‘documentary’
that explained humanmotion capture and computer keyframe ani-
mation techniques in detail (see also [40]). Specifically, participants
learned that humanmotion capture involves recording real human
movement via sensors that are attached to the body, whereas
computer-generated keyframe animation involves a computer
algorithm that fills in intermediate frames of a movement between
predefined start and end positions. To further induce believability,
the Poser stimuli used in the actual experiment were briefly seen
in several parts of the cover story documentary to reinforce the
idea that both kinds of animation could lead to the types of stimuli
observed in the present study. In reality, however, all stimuli
used in the real experiment were made with computer keyframe
animation (the technique used by POSER software), which
closely approximates real biological motion. After watching the
documentary, participants were asked whether they had under-
stood how both techniques were used to animate avatars, and
whether they had any questions about the techniques before the
experiment started.
(d) Behavioural procedure and task
Participants’ task in the scanner was to carefully observe 240 video
stimuli during one functional run (each of 60 videos was repeated
four times in total during the experiment). The videos were
blocked into groups of five (with each group of five videos featur-
ing either the human or the robot avatar), and participants
observed a total of 48 blocks of five videos containing equal num-
bers of each agent form/belief pairing. Before each block of five
videos was played, a cueing screen appeared for 2 s that specified
that the following videos were made either withmotion capture or
computer keyframe animation (figure 1b). The order of instruction
screens and the individual actions that made up each series of five
videos was pseudo-randomly assigned.
After each video, one of two questions appearedwhich partici-
pants were required to answer: either (i) howmuch did you like the
video you just saw? or (ii) how smooth did you find the movement
in the previous video? These questions were chosen for several
reasons. First, we wanted to determine how stimulus and knowl-
edge cues to human animacy influence perception of the stimuli
at a behavioural level. Second, two questions were chosen so that
open box
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Figure 2. Details of experimental materials and design. (a)(i) Eight of the 10 actions featured in the stimuli set (the remaining two, ‘toss ball’ and ‘hammer nail’ are
seen in (a)(ii) and in (b)). (a)(ii) The three viewing angles each action was ‘filmed’ from, to create a larger, richer stimulus set. (b) The 2  2 factorial design that
enabled investigation of bottom-up features (whether the agent looked like a human or robot; rows of design) as well as top-down features (whether participants
were told the videos were created using human motion capture or computer animation; columns of design).
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asked, which required them to maintain attention to the stimuli.
Participants made their ratings on a 1–8 scale via a fibre-optic
scanner compatible button box. Following scanning, participants
completed a debriefing survey where they were explicitly asked
whether they noticed anything of note about the stimuli, as well
as what they believed the true goal of the study was. The six par-
ticipants (of the original sample of 29 participants) who raised
suspicions the stimuli seemed to be the same and only the instruc-
tions changed were excluded from the final sample. Upon
completing this survey, all participants were told the true nature
of the study and compensated for their time.
(e) MRI acquisition
Functional neuroimagingwas acquired using a Bruker 3 TeslaMed-
spec 20/100 whole-body MR scanning system, equipped with a
standard birdcage head coil. Functional images were acquired con-
tinuously with a single-shot gradient echo-planar imaging
sequence with the following parameters: echo time (TE)¼ 30 ms,flip angle ¼ 908, repetition time (TR) ¼ 2000 ms, acquisition band-
width 100 kHz. Twenty-four axial slices allowing for full-brain
coverage were acquired in ascending order (pixel matrix¼ 64 
64; FOV ¼ 24 cm, resulting in an in-plane resolution of 3.75
3.75 mm2, slice thickness ¼ 4 mm, interslice gap ¼ 1 mm). Slices
were oriented parallel to the bicommissural plane (AC-PC line).
The first two volumes of each functional run were discarded to
allow for longitudinal magnetization to approach equilibrium.
An additional 813–830 volumes of axial images were collected.
Geometric distortions were characterized by a B0 field map scan
(consisting of a gradient echo readout (32 echoes, inter-echo time
0.64 ms) with a standard two-dimensional phase encoding). The
B0 field was obtained by a linear fit to the unwarped phases of
all odd echoes. Following the functional run and field map scan,
24 two-dimensional anatomical images (256 256 pixel matrix,
T1-weighted MDEFT sequence) were obtained for normalization
purposes. In addition, for each participant, a sagittal T1-weighted
high-resolution anatomical scanwas recorded in a separate session.
The anatomical images were used to align the functional data slices
with a three-dimensional stereotaxic coordinate reference system.
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Behavioural responses to the smoothness and liking questions
asked during the imaging task were combined to form a single
dependent variable and were analysed with a 2 (Agent Form:
human, robot)  2 (Belief Manipulation: human motion capture,
computer-generated animation) repeated measures ANOVA.ypublishing.org
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
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Data were realigned and unwarped in SPM8 (Wellcome Depart-
ment of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK) and normalized to
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template with a resol-
ution of 3  3  3 mm. Slice timing correction was performed
after realignment. Functional data were normalized to individual
participants’ T1 anatomical scans with a resolution of 3 mm3. All
images were then spatially smoothed (8 mm). A design matrix
was fitted for each participant, with each type of video (Human
with Motion Capture instruction, Human with Computer Anima-
tion instruction, Robot withMotion Capture instruction andRobot
with Computer Animation instruction), the belief manipulation
instruction screen and the question/response period modelled as
a boxcar function convolved with the standard haemodynamic
response function. The imaging analyses were designed to achieve
the following three primary objectives:(i) Main effect of stimulus cues
First, we evaluated the main effect of visual cues to the socialness
of an observed agent. To achieve this, we compared observation
of actions performed by the human avatar to the robot avatar
(human . robot), as well as the inverse (robot . human).(ii) Main effect of knowledge cues
We next assessed the main effect of our belief manipulation. We
evaluated brain regions more engaged when videos were believed
to have a human origin (motion capture. computer animation),
or when videos were believed to be computer-generated
(computer animation.motion capture).(iii) Interaction between stimulus and knowledge cues
The third set of contrasts examined the interactions between
agent form and belief cues. The aim of these interaction analyses
was to determine the extent to which brain regions associated
with the action observation, mentalizing or person perception
networks are sensitive to specific pairings of stimulus-driven
and knowledge-based cues to human animacy. The first inter-
action contrast interrogated brain regions more engaged when
viewing congruent agent/belief pairings more than incongruent
pairings. An example of a congruent pairing would be a human
agent paired with motion capture belief or a robotic agent paired
with computer-generated belief, whereas incongruent pairings
would feature a human agent paired with computer animation
belief or the robotic agent paired with motion capture belief.
The inverse interaction examined brain regions more engaged
when viewing the incongruent agent/belief pairings compared
to the congruent pairings.
All neuroimaging analyses were evaluated at the whole-brain
level with a voxel-wise threshold of p, 0.005 uncorrected and
k ¼ 10 voxels [52]. Table 1 lists all regions that meet this
threshold. To most clearly illustrate all fMRI findings, t-images
are visualized on a participant-averaged high-resolution anatom-
ical scan. Parameter estimates (beta values) were extracted and
plotted for visualization purposes only for the two interaction
analyses. Anatomical localization of all activations was assigned
based on consultation of the Anatomy Toolbox in SPM [53,54].3. Results
(a) Behavioural data
During scanning, participants rated each video on how smooth
they found themovement or howmuch they enjoyedwatching
it. Due to an error in the MATLAB code, it was not possible
to separate ratings of liking and smoothness for the main
experiment. However, a follow-up behavioural study was
performed with 30 naive participants who performed the
identical task with the same stimuli. These data showed that
across all 120 stimuli/instruction pairings, ratings of liking
and smoothness correlated at r ¼ 0.53, p, 0.001. As prior
work suggests that both questions tap into the same psycho-
logical construct (i.e. we tend to like movements more that
are smooth [55], and participants’ ratings of movement
smoothness and liking strongly correlate in other experimental
settings [56]), we considered it valuable to examine behaviour-
al responses as a single combined variable. A repeated
measures ANOVA revealed that participants ratedmovements
they thought to be generated by human motion capture as
significantly smoother and more pleasing to watch than
videos they believed to be generated by computer animation,
F1,22¼ 21.28, p, 0.001 (figure 3). No main effect of agent
( p ¼ 0.39) emerged, nor was any interaction between belief
and agent manifest in the data (p ¼ 0.79). These data suggest
that beliefs influence our dependent measure more than an
agent’s form.(b) Functional imaging data
(i) Main effects of stimulus cues
The first imaging analyses investigated the extent to which
visual cues to human animacy influence action perception.
No suprathreshold clusters emerged from the human .
robot form contrast. The inverse contrast (robot. human
form) revealed engagement of bilateral ventral temporal
and occipital cortices, which survived correction for multiple
comparisons ( p, 0.005, FWE-corrected), as well as engage-
ment of portions of the left superior temporal gyrus and
hippocampus (table 1b and figure 4a). Similar to findings
reported by Cross et al. [32], this result suggests greater
high- and low-level visual engagement when observing a
robotic agent execute actions.(ii) Main effect of knowledge cues
The next set of contrasts evaluated the impact of belief or
knowledge cues to human animacy on action perception.
The first contrast (human motion capture. computer key-
frame animation belief ) revealed activity within the right
inferior occipital and fusiform gyri. While these brain regions
did not survive correction for multiple comparisons, it is
nonetheless of interest to note that the cluster located
within the right inferior occipital gyrus closely corresponds
to functional localizations of the OFA (less than 6 mm
away [57]). Moreover, the peak of the cluster in fusiform
gyrus is 14 mm away from an average peak location of this
region when functionally localized, as reported by Spiridon
et al. [58]. It should be noted, however, that the fusiform clus-
ter identified in the present study is more anterior to most
reports of the FFA. Clusters also emerged in the left precu-
neus, as well as the left superior parietal lobule also
emerged from this contrast (table 1c and figure 4b). The
Table 1. Main effects and interaction from whole-brain analyses. MNI coordinates of peaks of relative activation within regions responding to the main effects
of agent, collapsed across instruction (a: observing a human compared to a robot perform an action; and b: observing a robot compared to a human perform
an action), the main effects of belief manipulation, collapsed across agent (c: observing actions said to be made by human motion capture compared to
computer-generated animation; and d: observing actions said to be made by computer-generated animation compared to human motion capture) and the
interactions between agent form and belief manipulation (e: observation of congruent agent/belief pairings; and f: observation of incongruent agent/belief
pairings). Results were calculated at a voxel-level threshold of p, 0.005, k ¼ 10 voxels. Up to three local maxima are listed when a cluster has multiple
peaks more than 8 mm apart. Entries in bold denote activations signiﬁcant at the false discovery rate cluster-corrected level of p, 0.05. HF, human form; RF,
robot form; MCB, motion capture belief; CGB, computer-generated belief.
MNI coordinates
region BA x y z t-value cluster size p-value
main effect: stimulus-based cues to socialness
(a) human . robot agent
no suprathreshold clusters emerged from this contrast
(b) robot. human agent
L fusiform gyrus 37 224 276 211 8.20 1422 <0.001
R fusiform gyrus 37 27 276 211 7.34 <0.001
L cerebellum lobule VIIa 221 282 220 7.18 <0.001
L superior temporal gyrus 22 245 21 28 3.65 26 0.001
L hippocampus 28 230 231 22 3.24 10 0.002
main effect: knowledge-based cues to socialness
(c) human motion capture . computer-generated animation belief
R inferior occipital gyrus 19 27 279 217 4.14 39 ,0.001
R inferior occipital gyrus 19 36 282 214 3.75 0.001
R fusiform gyrus 37 39 267 220 3.33 0.002
L precuneus 5/31 26 237 43 3.77 48 0.001
L middle cingulate cortex 5 26 249 46 3.42 0.001
R fusiform gyrus 36 33 243 28 3.48 27 0.001
L superior parietal lobule 7/39 30 270 46 3.24 11 0.002
(d) computer-generated animation. human motion capture belief
no suprathreshold clusters emerged from this contrast
interactions between stimulus- and knowledge-based cues to socialness
(e) congruent . incong pairings: (HF w/ MCB) þ (RF þ CGB) . (HF w/ CGB) þ (RF w/ MCB)
L posterior cingulate cortex 23 23 243 10 4.00 24 ,0.001
midline mid cingulate cortex 24 0 213 31 3.96 32 ,0.001
L middle cingulate cortex 24 23 222 25 2.89 0.004
L middle cingulate cortex 24 23 24 19 3.54 24 0.001
(f ) incongruent . cong pairings: (HF w/ CGB) þ (RF w/ MCB) . (HF w/ MCB) þ (RF þ CGB)
R inferior frontal gyrus 45 33 23 19 4.15 17 ,0.001
R cerebellum lobule VI 6 279 223 3.70 15 0.001
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typically found with a theory of mind localizer task based
on comparing beliefs to physical stories [59]. The inverse
contrast (computer keyframe animation. human motion
capture) did not reveal any suprathreshold activations.
(iii) Interaction between stimulus and knowledge cues
The next set of analyses investigated the extent to which brain
regions associated with social perception are influenced by
the interaction of stimulus and knowledge cues to human
animacy. The first interaction examined congruent pairings
of agent and belief compared to incongruent pairings((human form þmotion capture belief ) and (robot form þ
computer animation belief ) . (human form þ computer ani-
mation belief ) and (robot form þmotion capture belief )).
Three uncorrected clusters emerged along the midline cingu-
late cortex, including middle and posterior cingulate cortices
(table 1e and electronic supplementary material, figure A).
The parameter estimate plots reveal evidence for crossover
interactions for the two middle cingulate activations, while
the interaction within posterior cingulate cortex appears to
be driven most by a stronger response to the human agent
being paired with motion capture instructions compared to
computer animation instructions.
subjective video ratings during fMRI
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Figure 3. Behavioural data from fMRI task. Plots illustrate mean ratings
reported by participants to questions interrogating how smooth participants
found the movements or how much they enjoyed watching them. A main
effect of belief was manifest, such that participants found those action
videos they believed to originate from human motion capture techniques
to be smoother and more enjoyable to watch than videos they believed
to originate from computer-generated animation. No other main effects or
interactions were observed.
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engaged when observing incongruent compared to congruent
form and belief pairings ((human formþ computer animation
belief) and (robot form þmotion capture belief). (human
form þmotion capture belief) and (robot form þ computer ani-
mation belief)). This contrast revealed two uncorrected clusters:
one in the right inferior frontal gyrus, and a second in the cer-
ebellum (table 1f and electronic supplementary material, figure
B). For this interaction, it is of note that the interaction present
within these two brain regions is driven by different stimuli
(see parameter estimates in electronic supplementary material,
figure B). Specifically, robotic agents pairedwithmotion capture
instructions seem to drive the cerebellar region most strongly,
while the human agents paired with computer animation
instructions drive the inferior frontal gyrus region most.4. Discussion
Prior research has revealed that many different cues to human
animacy engage brain networks associated with social cogni-
tion, while less is known about the relationship between
these cues. In the present study, we used video stimuli featur-
ing kinematically identical actions performed by a human or
robotic agent and an elaborate belief manipulation to test
the extent to which stimulus and knowledge cues to human
animacy influence perception. Behaviourally, participants
reported actions believed to originate from humanmotion cap-
ture to be smoother and more enjoyable to watch than those
believed to have computer animation origins, while differences
in agent form did not affect ratings. The neuroimaging findings
echoed this pattern, with knowledge cues to human animacy
showing subtle influence (at a liberal threshold) on brain
circuits implicated in social cognition.
We failed to find evidence that visual cues to human ani-
macy more strongly engage the action observation, person
perception or theory of mind networks than visual cues to a
robotic agent, as might have been predicted. In contrast, we
found a robust, cluster-corrected area of activation spanning
ventral temporal and occipital cortices when participants
observed actions performed by a robotic compared tohuman-like agent. These findings raise questions about the
role played by stimulus cues to human animacy, while also
highlighting the influence of knowledge cues on social percep-
tion when perceiving identical agents and actions. Together,
theyprovide new insights into the supportingneural architecture
and behavioural consequences of social perception.
(a) Belief about humanness influences perception, as
shown by brain and behavioural responses
While some prior studies have failed to find evidence that
belief about the human origins of a stimulus can impact per-
ception [28], a growing body of evidence supports the notion
that beliefs about humanness influence the way we perceive
and imitate other agents [40–43,45]. Our results are consistent
with these findings as participants were more likely to report
actions supposedly originating from real human movements
as smoother and more pleasing to watch (questions that tap
into how natural or human-like an agent or action appears
[56]). Our findings also fail to demonstrate that differences in
agent form influence these ratings, which further suggests
that knowledge cues can dominate stimulus cues in explicit
evaluation of social features of an observed action [42]. A chal-
lenge for future behavioural research will be to systematically
investigate how knowledge cues to animacy impact different
facets of social cognition. To date, for example, perceptual
and imitative processes have been studied separately, and
the relationship between these key aspects of social cognition
and knowledge cues to human animacy remains unexplored.
At the neural level, our findings provide some evidence
that actions paired with a human- compared to computer-
generated belief lead to greater engagement of brain regions
associated with person perception and theory of mind.
Specifically, portions of the right inferior occipital gyrus
and fusiform gyrus responded more to the same stimuli
when they were paired with human motion capture instruc-
tions. Both regions are located in close proximity to patches
of cortex that are face selective including the OFA [57] and
fusiform face [58] and body areas [60]. It is of note that
these two brain regions associated with processing the
human face were modulated in this instance by social
knowledge, and not differences in stimulus-driven features.
Also important is the emergence of a cluster within the right
precuneus from this same contrast. The precuneus is consist-
ently implicated in theory-of-mind tasks and is believed to
play a role in explicit belief processing [61,62]. If these results
were to be replicated by future studies, they would suggest
that parts of the social brain network involved in perceiving
others’ physical features and reasoning about others’ minds
are engaged when viewing agents whose actions are believed
to have human origins. Revisiting the study by Stanley et al.
[42], these researchers varied the motion parameters of point-
light actions (ranging from veridical displays of the original
action to completely scrambled versions of each action),
and, as in the current study, they also varied instructions
(human- or computer-generated). For the main effect of instruc-
tions (human. computer), and similar to the present study,
Stanley and co-workers reported greater engagement of brain
regions associated with mentalizing. Consistent with Stanley
and co-workers’ interpretation of this finding [42], we propose
that based on believing that an agent is more human in
nature, greater demands are placed on extracting relevant cues
to support and evaluate this belief, changing the observer’s
STG
FG
IOG
FG
SPL
main effect of belief manipulation:
motion capture > computer generated
main effect of agent from:
robot > human
precuneus
t - value t - value
z = –11 z = –17 z = –8
z = 46
8 4
1 1
human motion capture computer animation
(b)(a)
Figure 4. Main effects of agent form (stimulus) and belief manipulation (knowledge). Panel (a) illustrates brain regions more engaged when participants watched
actions performed by a robotic avatar compared to a human avatar. Panel (b) shows brain regions more engaged when participants watched videos they believed to
originate from human motion capture compared to computer animation. Full details of these findings are presented in table 1. STG, superior temporal gyrus; FG,
fusiform gyrus; IOG, inferior occipital gyrus; SPL, superior parietal lobule.
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that visual inputs are matched against a human template more
in the human- than computer-belief condition. This process
engages theory of mind and person perception in combination.
This interpretation, however, remains speculative at this stage
and will require further research to test it thoroughly.(b) Revisiting stimulus cues to human animacy and the
action observation network’s role in social
perception
In contrast to a number of previous studies [27,39,63,64], we
failed to find behavioural or brain-based evidence that stimu-
lus cues to human animacy enhance action perception relative
to non-human stimulus cues. Instead, we contribute further
support, which survives correction for multiple comparisons,
to a growing body of evidence that suggests that non-human
stimulus cues can lead to the same or even an enhanced
engagement of high- and low-level visual areas and the
AON [21,30–33]. Specifically, we add to the evidence that
social brain circuits including the AON are frequently
indifferent to stimulus cues to human animacy.
Although visually salient differences between the human
and robot avatar are apparent, the AON did not respond to
this difference in the present study. An exploratory analysis
of each stimulus form compared independently to an implicit
baseline revealed that observing the human or robot agent in
isolation resulted in widespread, robust engagement of bilat-
eral AON, fusiform and occipitotemporal brain regions. The
results of these simple contrasts help to rule out the possi-
bility that the lack of findings in the human. robot
contrast are due to a peculiarity of the human stimuli not
engaging such brain networks on their own. The present
findings could possibly be due to the fact that both agents
executed the identical goal-directed actions (cf. [30,31]) or
because the robot and human forms shared some features
(i.e. a head atop a torso with two arms). Even though thehuman and robot forms were generated with the same CGI
package, one potential reason the AON might have failed
to discriminate between the agents might be because the
human form was slightly less human than a video of a real
person would be. Another possibility for why we found
greater engagement of brain regions associated with person
perception when observing a robot compared to a human
could be that these brain regions are engaged to assimilate
the robotic agent with a more familiar and predictable
human template. A similar idea was discussed by Cross
et al. [32] in light of finding more robust AON engagement
when observing robotic compared to human-like actions.
Recent work [65] lends tentative support to the idea that
greater engagement of occipitotemporal brain regions when
observing unfamiliar visual stimuli (such as the robotic
actions in [32] and the robotic agents in the current study)
might indeed be due to differences in predictability, as out-
lined by a predictive coding model of action perception [66].
Regardless of the reason for the absence of a difference in
AON engagement observed between human and non-human
stimulus cues in our study, the current findings suggest that
the importance of a human-like form to social perception
may have been overstated. Other factors such as top-down
beliefs [42,45] and bottom-up kinematic information [27] also
shape social cognition when perceiving and interacting with
others [67,68]. Our data help to redress the balance of how
much weight the AON assigns to self–other similarities on a
form-based, visual level. Future research investigating percep-
tion of human animacy may explore which social brain
mechanisms are specifically tuned to respond to the extent to
which a stimulus is perceived as being ‘like me’, and what
other complementary mechanisms might be at play [69,70].
Returning to the ‘like-me’ account of social cognition, the cur-
rent findings contribute to this view by demonstrating that
social brain circuits may be tuned to detect human animacy
based on knowledge cues that signal an agent to be ‘like me’.
While we fail to find behavioural or imaging evidence
demonstrating that visual cues to humanness influence
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analysis of the human. robot form contrast (evaluated at
p, 0.01, k ¼ 10 voxels) revealed activity within the right tem-
poroparietal junction, centred on coordinates x ¼ 51, y ¼ 237,
z ¼ 27. While this finding provides weak evidence that brain
structures implicated in social cognition [59] might indeed be
more engaged when observing human compared to robotic
agents, we are reluctant to interpret this finding further due
to the lack of statistical strength. The clearer message to
emerge from the main effects of the present study is that top-
down belief cues to human animacy shape social perception
to a stronger degree than bottom-up visual form cues to
human animacy, with stimuli paired with human beliefs
associated with engagement of brain regions implicated in
person perception and theory of mind.
(c) Interactions between stimulus and knowledge cues
to human animacy
The design of the present study enabled us to address how
stimulus and knowledge cues to human animacy interact
during action perception. Findings from the contrast compar-
ing congruent with incongruent pairings of stimulus and
knowledge cues failed to showmodulation of the action obser-
vation, person perception or mentalizing networks. Instead,
we report engagement of three uncorrected clusters spanning
the middle and posterior cingulate cortex. However, as this
finding was not predicted, we are reluctant to interpret it
further. The result from the incongruent pairings interaction
revealed an uncorrected cluster within the right inferior frontal
gyrus located in a similar coordinate space to recent meta-ana-
lyses of the AON [9,11]. One simple interpretation of this
finding, consistent with a rich literature on executive control,
is that viewing incongruent pairings of agent form and human-
ness belief requires greater attentional control than when
pairings are congruent [71]. Alternatively, it is possible that
increased engagement of this sensorimotor brain region
when viewing incongruent stimulus and knowledge pairings
relates to increased demands onmotor simulationmechanisms
to reconcile human and artificial features of an observed agent.
In order to evaluate this necessarily speculative interpretation,
further research is required to replicate and more fully delin-
eate how stimulus and knowledge cues to human animacy
interact. If we take a step back and attempt to construct a
broader view of how the current study’s findings fit in to the
wider literature on the biological substrates of social perception
and social cognition, given that some findings do support the
‘like-me’ hypothesis [25–29], while others do not [30–33],
and the fact that not all reported results survive correctionfor multiple comparisons, replication of these findings will be
important for future progress towards understanding how
we perceive animacy in other agents.(d) Multiple routes to socialness and considerations
for social artificial agent design
The theoretical implications of the current study and research
reviewed in this paper extend beyond the laboratory and
serve to inform disciplines in addition to social cognition and
neuroscience, including robotics. Over the past decade, individ-
uals working to develop socially interactive artificial agents,
including robots and avatars, are taking an increased interest
in social cognition and social neuroscience research that exam-
ines the impact of ‘like-me’-ness on how we perceive and
interact with such agents [72–75]. An ongoing goal for robotics
designers has been tomaximize the similarityof artificial agents
to humans, in terms of appearance and movement (while per-
haps attempting to circumnavigate the uncanny valley), in an
attempt to make particular artificial agents as ‘like me’ as pos-
sible [76]. However, findings from the current study and
considerations raised by related work suggest that how an
agent is perceived as being ‘like me’ can take many forms and
is not only dictated by how convincingly a robot looks or
moves like a human. Pre-conceived beliefs about robots will
impact their reception in the workplace, schools, care homes
and other social settings, and will undeniably shape how
effective human–robot interactions will be. Thus, human
knowledge about and attitudes towards robots will need to
be optimized as much as a robot’s physical form and motion
parameters. As such, roboticists and computer animators
stand to benefit from further dialogue and collaboration with
researchers investigating mechanisms of social perception and
their consequences for social interaction.
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